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INDEMNIFICATION, AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
IN SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
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INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, the relationship between law enforcement and the com-munities they serve has been at the forefront of public discourse in the
media, legislative bodies, academic institutions, and the public at large.1
Recent high-profile incidents involving police-civilian interactions in Fer-
guson, Missouri; Baltimore, Maryland; Staten Island, New York; Charlotte,
North Carolina; and Falcon Heights, Minnesota, have invoked passionate
debate from all corners of the nation.2  The prevailing theme is that in far
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1. See, e.g., David Hudson, Building Trust Between Communities and Local Police,
WHITE HOUSE BLOG: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Dec. 1, 2014), https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/12/01/building-trust-between-communities-
and-local-police [https://perma.cc/9J4Z-KJE7].
2. See, e.g., Lydia Polgreen, From Ferguson to Charleston and Beyond, Anguish
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too many instances, law enforcement officers are not held accountable for
their wrongful acts.3
42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows a person to bring a civil suit against a govern-
ment official for depriving him or her of a constitutional right.4  Not sur-
prisingly, police officers are frequent defendants in § 1983 litigation.5
Theoretically, a police official will incur substantial costs defending against
a § 1983 claim.6  Presumably, he or she must hire an attorney to provide
representation and counsel and, in the event of an adverse judgment,
must pay damages, costs, and perhaps attorney’s fees.  Yet, in practice, po-
lice officials seldom bear the costs of litigation; instead, the employing mu-
nicipality does.7
For years, scholars have intuited that municipalities were indemnify-
ing police officials for their misconduct.8  Recently, Professor Schwartz evi-
denced this intuition through an empirical study.9  She found that “police
officers are virtually always indemnified.”10  Schwartz’s piece also argues
that many aspects of § 1983 jurisprudence are based upon the assumption
that police officers are personally responsible for the civil judgments
against them and considers the implications of these flawed assump-
tions.11  However, as Schwartz acknowledges, her article does not tackle
why so many municipalities indemnify their police officials, even when the
police officer has been denied qualified immunity or engaged in wrongful
3. See Wesley Lowery et al., Police Have Killed Nearly 200 People Who Were in





4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376 (2007) (suing police officer for
alleged Fourth Amendment violation); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S.
748, 755 (2005) (suing three police officers for Due Process violation); Chavez v.
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 765 (2003) (alleging deprivation of Fifth Amendment
rights); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (alleging deprivation of
Fourth Amendment rights); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 169–70 (1961) (suing
police officers and the City of Chicago).
6. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 827–28 (1982) (holding that
defendants are only subject to qualified immunity, not absolute immunity).
7. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890
(2014) (concluding that “[p]olice officers are virtually always indemnified”).
8. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51
VAND. L. REV. 583, 588 n.17 (1998); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions
About Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 481 (2011); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In
Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 50 n.16 (1998).
9. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 890.
10. See id. (finding in a recent five-year period “in forty-four of the country’s
largest jurisdictions, officers financially contributed to settlements and judgments
in just .41% of the approximately 9225 civil rights damages actions resolved in
plaintiffs’ favor”).
11. See id. at 892–900 (discussing how the assumption officers are personally
liable underlies doctrines of qualified immunity and municipal liability).
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or criminal conduct.12  As one might expect, the answer to this can de-
pend on a number of different factors, including the relevant indemnifica-
tion statute, the contractual agreement the police union might have with
the state, and policy concerns.  How these factors coalesce likely will vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, the Authors believe a great
deal may be learned by carefully examining indemnification decisions in a
single municipality.  To this end, this Article considers municipal decisions
to indemnify police officials in § 1983 litigation in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.13
We have found that indemnification decisions in Philadelphia are sel-
dom dictated by § 1983’s elements or indemnification statutes, but instead
are guided by policy considerations, which overwhelmingly direct deci-
sion-makers towards indemnification.  Part I considers indemnification in
§ 1983 cases from statutory, doctrinal, and contractual perspectives.  Part
II discusses the principles and policies underlying many indemnification
decisions.  We conclude that although indemnification undermines of-
ficers’ financial accountability by blurring the line between individual and
municipal liability, it furthers several policy goals and addresses multiple
policy concerns and, accordingly, is an appropriate end to most § 1983
disputes.
I. INDEMNIFICATION LAW, § 1983 JURISPRUDENCE,
AND THE SPACE IN BETWEEN
Section 1983 allows persons deprived of a federally protected right to
bring a federal civil action against the persons responsible for that depriva-
tion.14  The statute was intended both to compensate plaintiffs for their
injuries and to deter government officials from depriving people of their
federal rights.15  Although the Supreme Court has held that municipali-
ties are persons for purposes of § 1983 liability, they have explicitly re-
jected a theory of respondeat superior liability, which would have made
the municipality vicariously liable for its employees’ torts when the tort
occurred within the scope of employment.16  The Court reasoned that vi-
carious liability was inconsistent with the statutory language.17  Neverthe-
less, municipal decisions to indemnify police officials for constitutional
12. See id. at 917.
13. To be clear, this Article does not address municipal indemnification deci-
sions in state law claims against police officials.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
15. See Michael LeBoff, A Need for Uniformity: Survivorship Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 221, 237 (1998).
16. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); see also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“Respondeat
superior assigns responsibility to an employer for the legal consequences that re-
sult from employees’ errors of judgment and lapses in attentiveness when the acts
or omissions are within the scope of employment.”).
17. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.
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torts have a similar effect as vicarious liability—the employer, not the em-
ployee, incurs the cost of the tortious conduct.18
Part I of this Article considers indemnification in § 1983 suits from
statutory, doctrinal, and contractual perspectives.  Part I(A) analyzes in-
demnification law in Pennsylvania.  Part I(B) considers the relationship
between § 1983 jurisprudence and indemnification law.  It finds that while
there is some overlap between the two, in most cases the underlying
§ 1983 determinations will not dictate the availability of indemnification.
Part I(C) considers the role of contractual agreements in indemnification
decisions.  Part I concludes that the ways in which indemnification law,
§ 1983 jurisprudence, and contractual agreements interact in Philadelphia
give municipal decision-making officials an enormous amount of discre-
tion when it comes to deciding whether or not to indemnify police officers
for alleged constitutional violations.
A. Indemnification Law
Indemnification is “[t]he action of compensating for loss or damage
sustained.”19  In the context of police indemnification, this typically refers
to the practice of a municipal employer paying what the police official
owes (either as a consequence of a settlement or an adverse judgment).
Additionally, although not technically indemnification, many municipal
employers also provide legal representation for their employees in civil
suits against the employee—even when the employee is being sued in a
personal capacity and the municipality is not a party to the suit.  These
employee benefits—indemnification and representation—usually result
from a municipal agreement with a police union, or a state or municipal
statute.20  And while some surveys suggest that “indemnification under
state and local law . . . varies widely among jurisdictions,”21 Professor
Schwartz’s recent empirical work concludes that “police officers are virtu-
ally always indemnified.”22
In Philadelphia, state law guides indemnification decisions.23  Under
title 42, section 8548 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes (section
8548), local agencies must indemnify their employees
18. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 944 (noting that “municipalities virtually al-
ways satisfy officers’ settlements and judgments, amounting to de facto respondeat
superior liability”).
19. Indemnification, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
20. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 890 (describing how indemnification policies
are popular in many police departments); Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald,
An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute,
19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 479, 495 (2009) (showing how municipal govern-
ments mitigate individual suits against police departments).
21. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 85 (1983).
22. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 890.
23. The Philadelphia Police Department’s contract with the City of Philadel-
phia is silent on the issue of indemnification.
4
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[w]hen an action is brought against an employee of a local
agency for damages on account of an injury to a person or prop-
erty . . . and it is judicially determined that an act of the employee
caused the injury and such act was, or that the employee in good
faith reasonably believed that such act was, within the scope of
his office or duties.24
“The purpose of this indemnification provision ‘is to permit local agency
employees to perform their official duties without fear of personal liability,
whether pursuant to state or federal law, so long as the conduct is per-
formed during the course of their employment.’”25  However, section
8550 of that same statute states that section 8548 “shall not apply” if a
judge determines that the act or omission giving rise to the civil action
“constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.”26
Based upon the plain language of the statute, one would reasonably
assume that in Philadelphia, indemnification turns on the following three
criteria: (1) a judicial determination that the officer caused the injury, (2)
a judicial determination that act was within the scope of officer’s duties
(or that the officer reasonably believed that the act was within the scope of
his or her duties) and (3) a judicial determination that the officer’s action
constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct.  If
both of the first two criteria are met, arguably, the City must indemnify the
officer.  If, however, the third criterion is met, the City may not indemnify
the officer.
Pennsylvania’s indemnification statute raises several related questions.
First, are the judicial determinations a prerequisite for indemnification?  If
not, is a municipality in Pennsylvania nevertheless precluded from indem-
nifying an official when that official has engaged in malicious or inten-
24. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8548(a) (West, Westlaw through
2017 Act 22).  Additionally, subsection (b) shields a government employee from
liability for any monies paid by the municipality for injuries the employee causes by
an act “within the scope of his office or duties” “or which he in good faith reasona-
bly believed to be within the scope of his office or duties.” See id.  This includes
“any expenses or legal fees incurred by the local agency while defending the em-
ployee against a claim for damages on account of an injury to a person or property
caused by an act of the employee.” Id.  All of the aforementioned provisions are
contingent upon the employee’s cooperation. See id. § 8548(c).
25. Pettit v. Namie, 931 A.2d 790, 798 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) (quoting
Wiehagen v. Borough of N. Braddock, 594 A.2d 303, 306 (Pa. 1991)).
26. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8550; see also Pettit, 931 A.2d at 799
(holding that “the local government agency attempting to avoid its indemnity obli-
gation bears the burden of proving there was a judicial determination of willful
misconduct” (citing Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994))).
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tional conduct?27  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed these
questions, at least to some extent, in Renk v. City of Pittsburgh.28
Renk is the leading Pennsylvania case on municipalities’ duty to in-
demnify police officials.  In December of 1984, Officer Renk arrested and
jailed Laney.29  Laney then sued Officer Renk and the City of Pittsburgh,
alleging that Officer Renk had committed assault and battery and falsely
imprisoned him.30  A jury found that Officer Renk was liable for the state
tort law claims and “[j]udgment was entered against Renk in the amount
of $7,648.08.”31  This amount included both compensatory and punitive
damages.32  Following the judgment, Renk sought indemnification from
the City.  The City countered that given the nature of the underlying civil
action there had been a judicial determination that Renk was not acting
within the scope of his duties and that Renk had engaged in willful mis-
conduct and, consequently, the City was not required to indemnify him.33
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that “absent a judicial deter-
mination that the officer’s actions constituted willful misconduct” “a po-
lice officer may be indemnified for the payment of a judgment entered in
a civil action.”34  However, the municipality is prohibited from indemnify-
ing a police official when there has been a judicial determination that the
he or she committed a crime, engaged in actual fraud, acted with actual
malice, or engaged in willful misconduct.35
The law of indemnification for Philadelphia (and municipalities
across Pennsylvania) may be summarized in three short phrases:
27. A third issue, which is addressed in Part I(B), is how judicial determina-
tions regarding the underlying civil action might affect questions of indemnifica-
tion.  For example, if a court determines that the police officer “acted under color
of state law” for purposes of § 1983 liability, does this necessitate a conclusion that
the defendant acted within the scope of his duties?  Similarly, if the court deter-
mines that a § 1983 plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages, does this necessarily
mean that the officer acted maliciously and intentionally, which might affect the
municipality’s obligation and ability to indemnify the official? See infra Part I(B).
28. 641 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1994).





34. See id. (emphasis added).
35. See Ferber v. City of Phila., 661 A.2d 470, 476 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995)
(holding that once “it has been judicially determined that the employees’ acts were
criminal in nature, under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550 the City has no liability for those acts”
and “the City’s governmental immunity is nonwaivable”).  Nevertheless, a finding
of willful misconduct for state tort law purposes does not necessarily prohibit the
municipality from indemnifying its police official.  For example, a determination
that an officer committed assault and battery under state tort law does not estab-
lish the officer engaged in the “willful misconduct” under section 8550 that would
prohibit indemnification. See Renk, 641 A.2d at 289.  Therefore, a municipality
may indemnify a police officer even if the police officer has been found liable of
an intentional tort under state law. See infra I(B)(3) and accompanying text
describing section 8550 willful conduct standard in further detail.
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(1) A municipality is required to indemnify a police officer when
a judge determines that the official caused the injury while acting
within the scope of his or her duties unless36
(2) A judge or jury has determined that the officer’s “act[ion]
constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful miscon-
duct,” in which case the municipality is prohibited from indemni-
fying a police officer.37
(3) A municipality MAY indemnify a police officer when a judge
has not decided that the officer caused the injury, that the officer
was acting within the scope of his or her duty, or that the officer
was engaged in willful misconduct, etc.38
Pennsylvania’s indemnification statute mandates when a municipality
must indemnify a municipal official and when it must not.  However, most
indemnification decisions fall within this third category—the municipality
is neither required to nor prohibited from indemnifying its officials.  This
is true for two reasons.  First, many civil actions are settled and, accord-
ingly, there is never a judicial determination of liability.  Furthermore, as
discussed in Part I(B), even in those cases where a judicial determination
is made regarding liability for the underlying civil action, it does not neces-
sarily follow that this resolves the question of indemnification.  Thus, the
municipality retains the discretion to indemnify its official.
B. The Relationship Between § 1983 Jurisprudence and Pennsylvania
Indemnification Law
Section 1983 liability and decisions to indemnify a police officer are
not wholly independent of one another.  Some scholars have suggested
that, at least in some instances, the underlying substantive § 1983 issues
will guide police indemnification decisions.39  Part I(B) considers the rela-
tionship between § 1983 and indemnification decisions.  We have found
36. Or that the officer reasonably believed that the act was within the scope of
his or her duties.
37. See Ferber, 661 A.2d at 475 (holding that once “it has been judicially deter-
mined that the employees’ acts were criminal in nature, under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550
the City has no liability for those acts” and “the City’s governmental immunity is
nonwaivable”).
38. But see City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ft. Pitt Lodge No. 1,
938 A.2d 225, 226 (Pa. 2007) (finding that in 1983, Pittsburgh and the Fraternal
Order of Police (FOP) Ft. Pitt Lodge No. 1 entered into a binding arbitration
agreement); City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ft. Pitt Lodge No. 1,
503 A.2d 995, 999 (Commw. Ct. Pa. 1986) (striking a section of FOP agreement
that required the City of Pittsburgh to indemnify officer upon determination “by
the City that that employee acted reasonably and in the good faith belief that his
actions were lawful and proper under the circumstances” and reasoning that “The
City may not elect those officers whom it chooses to indemnify” but instead must
rely upon judicial interpretation).
39. See Joyce Frank, Comment, Civil Practice—Indemnification Under the Massa-
chusetts Tort Claims Act: Government as Insurer, 92 MASS. L. REV. 37, 39 (2009) (dis-
cussing Maimaron v. Massachusetts, 865 N.E.2d 1098 (Mass. 2007)); see also Martin
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that although, theoretically, these underlying issues might seem to dictate
the decision to indemnify, this is rarely the case.  A careful examination of
§ 1983 substantive standards as compared to Philadelphia’s indemnifica-
tion law demonstrates that while some § 1983 and indemnification ele-
ments closely coincide with one another, other substantive § 1983 issues
are distinguishable from the dispositive indemnification issues.  Conse-
quently, § 1983 determinations rarely decide questions of indemnifica-
tion.  Furthermore, as briefly explored in the final section of Part I,
because most § 1983 cases are settled before trial, there is rarely a “judicial
determination” on the relevant indemnification issues.40
1. “Under Color of Law” and “Acting Within the Scope of His or Her Duties”
Victims of police excessive force may bring a § 1983 claim against the
individual officer alleging he or she deprived them of a constitutional
right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.41  In order to prove a civil
rights claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, that
the officer(s) acted under color of state law.42  Similarly, Philadelphia is
required to indemnify a police officer if, inter alia, a judge determines that
the officer was acting within the scope of his or her duties.43  If, however,
there is a judicial determination that the officer was not acting within the
scope of his or her duties (even if the plaintiff can prove that the officer
acted under the color of state law) then the City is not required to indem-
nify the officer.  On the other hand, if the plaintiff is unable to establish
that the defendant acted under the color of state law then the § 1983 will
fail and the question of indemnification is moot, at least with regards to
the § 1983 claims.44  This section considers the distinction between these
two elements.  It concludes that indemnification disputes in Pennsylvania
are rarely decided on the “scope of employment” issue.  In fact, the Au-
thors were unable to locate or recall one case in Pennsylvania where the
indemnification determination depended on whether the employee was
acting within the scope of his duty or office.  Nevertheless, we predict that
A. Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed That Municipality Will Indemnify Officer’s § 1983
Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1211 (2001).
40. As discussed in Part I(B)(6), in the absence of a judicial determination,
indemnification decisions largely fall within the discretion of policy-making offi-
cials. See infra Part I(B)(6) and accompanying notes.
41. See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook Cty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992); Bower v. Cty. of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 417 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
42. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (“By the plain terms of
§ 1983, two-and only two-allegations are required in order to state a cause of action
under that statute.  First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived
him of a federal right.  Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived
him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.”).
43. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8548 (West, Westlaw through 2017
Act 22).  This, of course, assumes that the officer has not engaged in conduct that
triggers section 8550’s prohibition.
44. Section 1983 plaintiffs may also bring state tort claims based upon the
same conduct.  However, state tort claims are beyond the scope of this Article.
8
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if Pennsylvania courts apply the state’s respondeat superior legal rules or
follow the law of other circuits who have considered this issue they would
likely reach the same conclusion for both questions.  If the defendant is
“acting under the color of state law” for purposes of § 1983, the court
should also find that he or she was acting within the scope of his or her
employment for indemnification purposes.45
In the overwhelming majority of § 1983 cases, there is little question
that the police officer was acting “under color of state law.”  In the vast
majority of § 1983 cases involving police, the officers are in uniform;
they’re driving marked patrol cars, and they’re wearing their badges and
department issued firearms.  In these instances, almost all actions taken by
officers are done so under the authority granted to them by the state.46
However, being employed by the city is not enough to transform any
action by an officer into an action under color of law.47  The acts of of-
ficers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded, whereas
acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included
whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it.48
The most difficult questions of “under color of state law” occur with
off-duty officers.  Is an off-duty officer who decides to intervene in a bar
fight involving his friends a state actor?  Is an officer who gets into a do-
mestic dispute with a family member—resulting in the use of physical
force and an arrest, a state actor?  In these types of instances, there is a real
legal question whether the officer was acting under color of law.
Being “off duty” does not necessarily mean that the officer is not act-
ing under the color of law.  Traditionally, “acting under color of state law
requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘pos-
sessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrong-
45. Of course, section 8550 still limits the circumstances in which a municipal-
ity may indemnify a police official.  For example, in Panas v. City of Philadelphia, the
jury found the police official was acting under state law.  871 F. Supp. 2d 370 (E.D.
Pa. 2012).  However, the municipality refused to indemnify him because he had
been convicted of murder by the time the civil proceedings occurred.  See infra
Part II(C) for a fuller discussion of the case.
46. For instance, if a patrol officer in full uniform stops an individual on the
street for questioning into the report of a robbery, that officer would be a state
actor, acting under the color of state law.
47. See Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1150 (3d Cir. 1995) (“It is
well settled that an otherwise private tort is not committed under color of law
simply because the tortfeasor is an employee of the state.”).
48. See id.; see also Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407, 408 (5th Cir. 1981)
(alleged assault by on-duty police chief at police station did not occur under color
of state law because altercation with plaintiff, defendant’s sister-in-law, arose out of
personal dispute and defendant neither arrested nor threatened to arrest plain-
tiff); Halwani v. Galli, No. Civ. A. 99-1450, 2000 WL 968219, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 13,
2000) (on-duty, uniformed police officer did not act under color of law because
the altercation arose out of a personal dispute and the officer did not arrest or
threaten to arrest the plaintiff); Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933, 937 (E.D.
Pa. 1968) (on-duty police officer’s instigation of a physical altercation and ex-
change of insulting names was purely “personal pursuit”).
9
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doer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”49  A court may find that a
police officer acted under color of law if (1) he depends upon the “cloak
of the state’s authority” as a means to commit the alleged improper acts,
and (2) that authority enables the officer to do what he did.50  An action
taken under the color of law is one taken under “pretense” of law.51  This
rule applies regardless of whether a police officer is on- or off-duty.52  For
example, in Stengel v. Belcher,53 an off-duty, out of uniform police officer
intervened in a bar fight with a gun and shot and injured the plaintiff.54
The Sixth Circuit held that the off-duty status of the officer is not disposi-
tive of a § 1983 claim, and that it is the nature of the act that controls.55
On the other hand, “acts of officers in the ambit of their personal
pursuits are plainly excluded.”56  Accordingly, the critical inquiry is
whether the purported violation of a plaintiff’s civil rights was committed
by an officer engaged in police action and not private action.  Perhaps the
most difficult category of cases is where officers use their authority for
their own private pursuits.  In Martinez v. Colon,57 an on-duty police officer
used his service weapon recklessly while bullying a fellow officer and shot
him.58  The First Circuit held that such bullying was not under color of law
merely because he used his service revolver.59  In making this determina-
tion, courts consider whether the actions under review were consistent
with actions taken by a police officer.60  Specifically, courts determine
whether there is evidence that the officer’s actions were calculated to pre-
serve the peace, protect life or property, arrest violators of the law, or pre-
vent crime.61  A police officer’s purely private acts which are not furthered
by any actual or purported state authority are not acts under color of state
law.62  Courts will consider an officer’s motivation in making this
determination.63
49. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
50. See Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 816, 818 (3d Cir. 1994);
Pryer v. City of Phila., No. Civ. A. 99-4678, 2004 WL 603377, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19,
2004); Johnson, 284 F. Supp. at 937.
51. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1944).
52. See Barna, 42 F.3d at 816.
53. 522 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1975).
54. See id. at 440.
55. See id. at 441.
56. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 111.
57. 54 F.3d 980 (1st Cir. 1995).
58. See id. at 982–83.
59. See id. at 987–88.
60. See Smith v. City of Phila., No. Civ. A. 2:00 CV 03623, 2002 WL 32130107,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2002).
61. See id.
62. See Jackson-Gilmore v. Dixon, Civ. A. 04-03759, 2005 WL 3110991, at *10
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2005).
63. The Third Circuit’s Model Jury Instructions lists a number of different
factors that may be relevant when the jury is determining whether a police officer
10
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Similar to § 1983’s “under color of law” requirement, Pennsylvania’s
municipal indemnification statute, section 8548, depends, in part, on
whether the employee was acting “within the scope of his office or duties.”
Somewhat surprisingly, it does not appear that any Pennsylvania court has
considered the relationship between these two elements or has even de-
fined “within the scope of his duties or office” within the context of in-
demnification.  However, Pennsylvania’s respondeat superior doctrine
does offer some insights.  In Fitzgerald v. McCutcheon,64 the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania explained respondeat superior liability as follows:
A master is liable for the acts of his servant which are committed
during the course of and within the scope of the servant’s em-
ployment.  This liability of the employer may extend even to in-
tentional or criminal acts committed by the servant . . . .  Where,
however, the employee commits an act encompassing the use of
force which is excessive and so dangerous as to be totally without
responsibility or reason, the employer is not responsible as a mat-
ter of law.  If an assault is committed for personal reasons or in
an outrageous manner, it is not actuated by an intent of perform-
ing the business of the employer and is not done within the
scope of employment.65
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the court in Fitzger-
ald held that the City of Philadelphia could not be held liable because a
defendant acted “under color of state law.” See MODEL CIV. JURY. INSTR. 4.4.2 (3d
Cir. 2015).  These factors are:
• Whether the defendant was on duty.  This factor is relevant but not
determinative. . . .
• Whether police department regulations provide that officers are on
duty at all times.
• Whether the defendant was acting for work-related reasons.  However,
the fact that a defendant acts for personal reasons does not necessarily
prevent a finding that the defendant is acting under color of state law.
A defendant who pursues a personal goal, but who uses governmental
authority to do so, acts under color of state law.
• Whether the defendant’s actions were related to his or her job as a
police officer.
• Whether the events took place within the geographic area covered by
the defendant’s police department.
• Whether the defendant identified himself or herself as a police
officer.
• Whether the defendant was wearing police clothing.
• Whether the defendant showed a badge.
• Whether the defendant used or was carrying a weapon issued by the
police department.
• Whether the defendant used a police car or other police equipment.
• Whether the defendant used his or her official position to exert influ-
ence or physical control over the plaintiff.
• Whether the defendant purported to place someone under arrest.
Id. cmt. (footnotes omitted).
64. 410 A.2d 1270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
65. Id. at 1271–72 (internal citations omitted).
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drunken off-duty police officer shot his neighbor during a personal dis-
pute.66  Specifically, the court noted that McCutcheon’s act “was outside
the scope of his employment.”67
The employee’s motives frequently are an important factor when de-
termining whether an employee was acting within the scope of his or her
employment.  In Butler v. Flo-Ron Vending Co.,68 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania again relied on the Restatement (Second) of Agency to de-
fine respondeat superior “within the scope of employment.”69  In Butler,
two supervisory employees investigating a former employee for burglariz-
ing the company planted evidence of the crime in the car of the former
employee.70  The court held that the employees were acting in the scope
of their employment when they planted the false evidence because partici-
pating in an investigation was part of the nature of their employment as
supervisory employees and was for the benefit of their employer.71  Simi-
larly, in Kull v. Guise,72 the court found that members of a tenure board
accused of mistreating a professor were acting within the scope of their
66. See id. at 1272.  The Restatement (Second) of Agency says that,
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially
within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in
part, by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally
used by the servant against another, the use of the force is not unexpect-
able by the master.  (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of
employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the
authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to
serve the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
67. See Fitzgerald, 410 A.2d at 1272.  In reaching this conclusion, the court
reasoned as follows:
His acts were motivated by reasons personal to himself and did not fur-
ther the purpose of his employment as a policeman.  He was off duty and
not then subject to the right of his employer’s control.  His act was so
outrageous, so criminal, and so incapable of anticipation by his employer,
that it must be held as a matter of law to exceed the scope of McCutch-
eon’s employment.  To hold a municipality liable for conduct of an off
duty policeman under the circumstances of this case on a theory of re-
spondeat superior would be unreasonable and would exceed the legiti-
mate legal and social purposes which sustain the doctrine.
Id.
68. 557 A.2d 730 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
69. See id. at 736.  To date, this appears to be the authoritative statement of
Pennsylvania law on this issue.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has applied this aspect of Butler on three separate occasions. See CNA v.
United States, 535 F.3d 132, 146 (3d Cir. 2008); Brumfield v. Sanders, 232 F.3d
376, 380–81 (3d Cir. 2000); Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1358 (3d Cir. 1993).
In Aliota, then-Circuit Judge Samuel Alito acknowledged that the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania had not affirmed the rule from Butler but predicted that, given the
opportunity, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would adopt that definition from
the Restatement. See Aliota, 984 F.2d at 1358.
70. See Butler, 557 A.2d at 732.
71. See id. at 737.
72. 81 A.3d 148 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
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employment because the actions were at least partially to advance the in-
terests of the employer, even if personal animosity played a role.73
The primary point of dispute in many “scope of employment” cases is
whether an employee’s motivations were at least partially to serve their
employer.  If the employee purely was engaged personal pursuits, and not
at all advancing his or her employer’s interests, then a court likely will find
that he or she was not acting within the scope of his or her employment.
As such, Pennsylvania’s respondeat superior standard and § 1983 “under
color of law” seem very similar to one another—both focus heavily on the
officer’s motivations—and, accordingly, are likely to echo one another.  If
the police official did not act under color of state law, then he or she is not
liable under § 1983 and the question of indemnification is moot.  If, how-
ever, the officer did act under color of state law then, to the extent it relies
on respondeat superior principles, the court will also likely find that the
officer was acting within the scope of his or her employment for indemni-
fication purposes.74
Other federal courts that have considered the relationship between
their own indemnification statutes and § 1983’s under color of law re-
quirement have found that both § 1983’s under color of law element and
the indemnification “scope of duty” requirement have been met.75  For
example, in Wilson v. City of Chicago,76 Andrew Wilson alleged that Com-
mander Burge tortured him to obtain a confession in violation of his con-
73. See id. at 150; see also Brumfield, 232 F.3d at 378 (concluding that allegation
of personal animosity alone was insufficient basis to conclude that prison employ-
ees who made for allegedly false statements were acting outside the scope of their
employment because making statements about fellow employees at the request of
one’s employer is part of the normal course of employment, and still within the
scope of employment.). But see DiStefano v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., 616 F.
App’x 478, 482 n.4 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that, under agency law, employee who is
interviewed at work about criminal conduct is not acting within the scope of her
employment because it is not within the scope of her duties as a sales associate and
it is not what she was employed to do).
74. Of course, indemnification is still subject to section 8550.  42 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8550 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 22).
75. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Chi., 120 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 1997); Dunton
v. Suffolk Cty., 580 F. Supp. 974, 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Sampson v. Kofoed, Nos.
8:07CV155, 8:08CV107, 2016 WL 7971575, at *15 (D. Neb. Mar. 30, 2016) (“The
concepts of ‘color of law’ and scope of employment can overlap and satisfy both
requirements.” (citation omitted)). But see McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1140
(9th Cir. 2000) (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)) (observing that
the Supreme Court has shown that color of law can be present, even where scope
of duty is not when, in Screws the Supreme Court concluded that police officer
went beyond the scope of his duties in beating a young man to death during an
arrest, but, nevertheless, they had acted under color of law); Jude v. City of Milwau-
kee, No. 06C1101, 2010 WL 2643383 (E.D. Wis. June 30, 2010) (“[A]n officer or
employee who is found to have acted under ‘color of law’ for purposes of Section
1983 is not necessarily entitled to indemnification . . . [t]he ‘under color of law’
category is broader than the ‘scope of employment’ category.” (citation omitted)).
76. 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993).
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stitutional rights.77  Wilson also sued the City of Chicago alleging “the City
of Chicago had had a de facto policy authorizing its police officers physi-
cally to abuse persons suspected of having killed or injured a police of-
ficer.”78  The case against the City failed but the court determined that
Burge was liable under § 1983.79  Pursuant to an Illinois state statute, Wil-
son sought payment from the City.80  Amongst its many arguments, Chi-
cago countered that Burge was not acting “within the scope of his
employment” when he tortured Wilson, and accordingly, they were not
required to pay under the applicable statute.81  Rejecting that argument,
the Seventh Circuit offered the following explanation:
This is not a case in which a police officer, while engaged on
police business, commits a wrong designed to advance his purely
private interests . . . .  Burge . . . was not pursuing a frolic of his
own.  He was enforcing the criminal law of Illinois overzealously
by extracting confessions from criminal suspects by improper
means.  He was, as it were, too loyal an employee.  He was acting
squarely within the scope of his employment.82
As the court explained in Coleman v. Smith,83 “those acts which are so
closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly
and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods,
even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objective of the
employment.”84
2. Municipal Liability and “Acting Within the Scope of His Duty”
In addition to suing the individual officer, a § 1983 plaintiff may also
sue the municipality that employs the officer.  However, the Supreme
77. See id. at 1236.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 1241.
80. Illinois state statute, entitled “Payment of Judgments or Settlements” re-
quires “a local public entity . . . to pay any tort judgment or settlement for compen-
satory damages (and may pay any associated attorney’s fees and costs) for which it
or an employee while acting within the scope of his employment is liable in the
manner provided in this Article.”  745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/9-102 (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. P.A. 100-25).
81. See Wilson, 120 F.3d at 683.
82. Id. at 685 (internal citations omitted).
83. 814 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 1149 (quoting Hibma v. Odegaard, 769 F.2d 1147, 1152 (7th Cir.
1985)); see also Graham v. Sauk Prairie Police Comm’n, 915 F.2d 1085, 1093 (7th
Cir. 1990) (holding that action falls within the scope of employment if “it is closely
connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably
incidental to it, that it may be regarded as a method, even though an improper
one, of carrying out the objects to the employment” (citation omitted)); Hibma,
769 F.2d at 1152 (concluding that officers who framed the plaintiff were acting
within the scope of their employment because, although there was obvious an
overriding personal motive, the defendants were still acting on behalf of their
employer).
14
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Court held in Monell v. Department of Social Services85 that a municipality will
not be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior.86  Rather, the plain-
tiff must prove that the municipality subjected, or caused the plaintiff to
be subjected, to the deprivation of a constitutional right.87  To do so, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation was the
result of a municipal policy, custom, or practice.88  As Professor Ravenell
has explained in detail elsewhere,89 a plaintiff may prove that the munici-
pality “caused” the deprivation through several different theories: “a writ-
ten policy that commands or compels” the officer to engage in the
unconstitutional behavior,90 an unwritten policy or custom that instructs
officers to behave unconstitutionally,91 a single decision or command by a
person with final policy making authority in that particular area for the
officer to undertake the unconstitutional conduct,92 and a failure to train
officers regarding the unconstitutionality of their behavior.93  “The ‘offi-
cial policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality
from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that mu-
nicipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually
responsible.”94
Assuming a § 1983 plaintiff is able to demonstrate the police officer
was acting pursuant to municipal policy when the officer deprived the
plaintiff of his or her constitutional right, one might argue that it necessa-
85. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
86. See id. at 691.
87. See id. at 692.
88. See id. at 691–95.
89. See Teressa E. Ravenell, Blame It on the Man: Theorizing the Relationship Be-
tween § 1983 Municipal Liability and the Qualified Immunity Defense, 41 SETON HALL L.
REV. 153, 161 (2011).
90. See id. at 161; see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
91. Custom can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct, al-
though not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and perma-
nent as virtually to constitute law. See Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480
(3d Cir. 1990); see also Fletcher v. O’Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793–94 (3d Cir. 1989)
(“Custom may be established by proof of knowledge and acquiescence”).
92. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986)).
93. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989).  Under a “failure to
train” theory of municipal liability, a plaintiff cannot usually prove a Monell claim
by simply pointing to a single instance, or even a few instances, of police miscon-
duct.  Instead, a plaintiff must show that the hierarchy of a municipal police de-
partment has been deliberately indifferent to an obvious need for better training,
discipline, and supervision of its police officers.  One way to prove this is to obtain
through the discovery process years’ worth of data and investigative reports.  A
plaintiff must then be able to audit and summarize those reports, and be able to
show a discernable pattern of police conduct that is in violation of citizen’s consti-
tutional rights.  On top of the already laborious process of going through all of the
data and documents, it is almost always necessary for a plaintiff to hire police prac-
tices experts who can than analyze and interpret the data.  As one can imagine,
this substantially adds to the already expensive process of proving a Monell claim.
94. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479 (emphasis in original).
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rily follows that the officer was acting “within the scope of his or her duty”
for indemnification purposes (or, at a minimum acted reasonably and in
the good faith belief that his actions were lawful and proper under the
circumstances).  This seems to be a reasonable conclusion.  A municipality
is liable if it promulgates a policy or gives a directive that causes a person
to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.  If a police official is fol-
lowing that municipal policy or directive it would seem to follow that the
police official is acting within the scope of his employment for indemnifi-
cation purposes, even if that directive turns out to be unconstitutional.
3. Excessive Force and the Willful Misconduct
Recently, the public debate on police misconduct largely has focused
on the amount of physical force, including deadly force, utilized by law
enforcement.95  To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff
must show a law enforcement officer, acting under color of law, deprived
him of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States—this includes the Fourth Amendment right to a reasonable
seizure.96  Part I(B)(3) considers the relationship between Fourth Amend-
ment excessive force determinations and decisions to deny police officers
indemnification because they engaged in willful misconduct.  We con-
clude that the finding of a Fourth Amendment excessive force violation
rarely will lead one to conclude that the officer also engaged in willful
misconduct because there is a clear disconnect between these two legal
standards.
All use-of-force cases, including those involving deadly force, are ana-
lyzed under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment.97
When a plaintiff contends that his Fourth Amendment rights have been
violated, the challenged conduct is scrutinized for conformity to a stan-
dard of reasonableness and the test used is an objective one.  The facts to
be considered include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the sus-
pect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.”98  Reasonableness is to be evaluated from the “perspective of a rea-
sonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hind-
95. See, e.g., REGULATING POLICE USE OF FORCE: SERIES OF ESSAYS, REGULATORY
REVIEW (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/02/13/regulating-
police-use-of-force/ [https://perma.cc/NUH3-2ULK].
96. The Fourth Amendment provides that
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
97. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
98. See id. at 396 (citation omitted).
16
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sight.”99  “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—
in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”100  The
Supreme Court has held that in light of the totality of the circumstances,
the test is “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light
of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivation.”101  The Court has emphasized that the
officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment
analysis.102
In contrast, under Pennsylvania law, “willful misconduct” is a wholly
subjective standard.  As the court summarized in Kuzel v. Krause,103 “[i]n
effect, the Supreme Court [of Pennsylvania] found that ‘willful miscon-
duct’ as used in 42 Pa C.S.A. § 8550 means ‘willful misconduct afore-
thought.’”104 Pettit v. Namie105 offered the following description of willful
misconduct:
Willful misconduct means that the actor desired to bring about the result
that followed, or at least that he was aware that it was substantially
certain to ensue . . . . Wanton misconduct, on the other hand, means
that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character,
in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to
have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that
harm would follow.106
Section 8550 only prohibits indemnification when the official engages in
willful misconduct.
Willful misconduct is a significantly higher standard than the Fourth
Amendment objective reasonableness standard.107  A court may find that
99. See id.
100. Id. at 396–97
101. See id. at 397 (citation omitted).
102. See id.; see also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (“[T]he
fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the
reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invali-
date the action taken as long the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that
action.”).
103. 658 A.2d 856 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
104. Id. at 860.
105. 931 A.2d 790 (Pa. Commw Ct. 2007).
106. Id. at 801 (emphasis added).
107. Compare Robbins v. Cumberland Cty. Children and Youth Servs., 802
A.2d 1239, 1252–53 (Pa. 2002) (“Willful misconduct . . . has been defined by our
Supreme Court to mean conduct whereby the actor desired to bring about the
result that followed or at least was aware that it was substantially certain to follow,
so that such desire can be implied. . . . To prove willful misconduct, a plaintiff must
establish that the actor desired to bring about the result that followed, or at least it
was substantially certain to follow, i.e., specific intent.”), with Graham v. Con-
nor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (defining Fourth Amendment reasonableness as
whether “the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
17
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a police official has violated the Fourth Amendment if the officer’s actions
were unreasonable—if a reasonable official in the officer’s position would
not have behaved as the officer behaved.108  Thus, a court may conclude
that an officer deprived a citizen of his right to be free from an unreasona-
ble seizure if the officer shot someone but a reasonable officer in that
position would not have used that level of force.109  In contrast, “[f]or
police officers, such willful misconduct is established by showing the of-
ficer not only intentionally used force, but intentionally used excessive
force.”110  In this example, willful misconduct would, in all intents and
purposes, require that the officer intended to violate the Fourth Amend-
ment, not simply that he intended to shoot the plaintiff.  In this respect,
Pennsylvania’s willful conduct standard seems to dovetail with § 1983’s
qualified immunity defense.
4. Qualified Immunity and Willful Misconduct
Even assuming a § 1983 plaintiff is able to establish the necessary ele-
ments of his or her excessive force claim, the plaintiff must still contend
with the qualified immunity defense in most cases.  As the Court explained
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,111 “government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”112  In the
context of a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, this means that if a
reasonable official in the officer’s position would not have realized that
the conduct at issue was unconstitutional, then the officer is entitled to
qualified immunity.  There are several reasons why an officer may not real-
ize the illegality of his or her conduct: because the legal rule is not clear
under the circumstances,113 because the officer is not aware of the rele-
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivations” (citations omitted)).
108. See, e.g., Estate of Smith, 318 F.3d 497, 515 (3d Cir. 2003) (“To state a
claim for excessive force as an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment, a plaintiff must show that a ‘seizure’ occurred and that it was unreasonable.”
(quoting Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 1999))); see also Graham, 490
U.S. at 396 (explaining that reasonableness of seizure is judged “from the perspec-
tive of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968))).
109. See, e.g., Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2002); Johnson v. City
of Phila., 105 F. Supp. 3d 474, 482 (E.D. Pa. 2015); cf. Royal v. Spragins, 575 F.
App’x. 300, 303–04 (5th Cir. 2014).
110. See Johnson, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 482 (emphasis added).
111. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
112. Id. at 818 (citations omitted).
113. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 229–30 (2009) (finding that
officers were entitled to qualified immunity where there was a divergence of views
between the courts regarding “consent-once-removed” entries and their own Fed-
eral Circuit had not yet ruled on the issue).
18
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vant constitutional rule,114 or because the officer makes a mistake assess-
ing the facts and applies the wrong facts to the right legal rule.115
Accordingly, when an officer is denied qualified immunity it is because he
or she knew or should have known that the conduct would deprive the
plaintiff of a constitutional right.  As the Court explained in Malley v.
Briggs,116 qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.”117
Building on this “knew or should have known” standard, one might
posit that if a police official is denied qualified immunity, he or she should
also be denied indemnification because the officer engaged in willful mis-
conduct.118  Qualified immunity and indemnification determinations may
jibe in certain circumstances.  For example, if a court concluded that the
defendant knew his or her conduct would violate the Fourth Amendment
it would follow that the official should be denied qualified immunity and
the municipality would be barred from indemnifying the official.  As dis-
cussed in the previous section, indemnification is prohibited with a judi-
cial determination of willful misconduct, which requires that the
defendant knowingly violates the law.119
However, one may not always deduce willful misconduct from a deci-
sion to deny an official qualified immunity.  A court should deny a govern-
114. Professor Ravenell offers the following explanation in a previous piece:
“Street-level” government officials, such as police officers and teachers,
seldom review and interpret judicial opinions.  Instead, they rely on those
persons charged with establishing municipal policy to promulgate rules
that are consistent with statutory law and legal opinions.  The failure of a
municipality to adequately counsel its employees regarding changes in
the law or to adopt policies necessary to effectuate the law may lead to . . .
“comprehensive-based illegality” . . . .  Even when a court declares certain
acts or behaviors to be unconstitutional, the message does not necessarily
reach everyone charged with following its command.  Government offi-
cials may violate clearly established legal rules simply because they are
following [an outdated] municipal policy and perhaps are unaware that
their conduct is unlawful.
Ravenell, supra note 89, at 156.
115. See, e.g., Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 215 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding jury
verdict that officer who shot a fellow police officer was entitled to qualified immu-
nity because it was objectively reasonable for him to mistake the officer for the
armed and dangerous suspect of whom they were in pursuit).
116. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
117. See id. at 341.
118. There are numerous examples of § 1983 excessive force cases where the
court denies a defendant police officials summary judgment motion because there
is a material dispute of facts. See, e.g., Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014)
(“Summary judgment is appropriate only if ‘the movant shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a))).  We, however, are referring only
to those cases where the court actually determines the officer is not entitled to
quailed immunity, not simply where the court denies defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment because of a factual dispute. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
741 (2002) (denying prison officials qualified immunity).
119. See supra Part I(A).
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ment official qualified immunity when the official should have known that
the conduct was unlawful.  The Court explained in Harlow, “[i]f the law
was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a
reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his
conduct.”120  In comparison, willful conduct requires actual knowledge of
the unlawfulness.121  Under Pennsylvania law, one may not establish will-
ful misconduct by simply showing the defendant should have known the
conduct would violate the law; instead he or she must demonstrate that
the officer desired or was substantially certain of the outcome.122  Igno-
rance of the law may be a basis for denying qualified immunity, but it is
insufficient to establish willful misconduct.
5. Punitive Damages and Willful Misconduct
In addition to compensatory damages, a § 1983 plaintiff may also seek
punitive damages against a government official if the plaintiff sues the offi-
cial in his or her personal capacity.123  The Court held in Smith v. Wade124
“that a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action
under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by
evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to
the federally protected rights of others.”125  First, a defendant has to be
sued in his or her individual capacity in order to be eligible to have puni-
tive damages awarded against him or her.126  Second, a defendant’s con-
duct has to be assessed to determine if it rises to a level of recklessness
120. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982).  Even assuming
the law is clearly established, the defendant still has an opportunity to show he or
she entitled to the defense by claiming “extraordinary circumstances” and proving
“that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard.” See
id. at 819.
121. See Pettit v. Namie, 931 A.2d 790, 801 (Pa. Commw Ct. 2007).
122. See id.
123. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).  Furthermore, “[p]unitive
damages can be awarded in a civil rights case where a jury finds a constitutional
violation, even when the jury has not awarded compensatory or nominal damages.”
See Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 430 (3d Cir. 2000).
124. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
125. Smith, 461 U.S. at 56.
126. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (find-
ing that “an award of punitive damages against a municipality ‘punishes’ only the
taxpayers, who took no part in the commission of the tort.”).  When a plaintiff sues
a government official in that person’s official capacity the plaintiff is, in fact, suing
the entity for which he or she works. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985).  Accordingly, suing a municipal police officer in his or her official capacity
is the equivalent of suing the municipality and the court should deny punitive
damages. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 267 (holding that awarding punitive dam-
ages against public servants in their official capacity would actually punish inno-
cent tax payers because these public servants are funded by the people); see also
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472–73 (1985) (holding that because suits against
public servants, like police officers in their official capacity, are in essence suing
the municipality, the municipality and its official extensions are immune from pu-
nitive damages.)
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described in Smith.127  Finally, if punitive damages are awarded, they are
accepted by the Court unless they are “so grossly excessive as to shock the
judicial conscience.”128  Punitive damages are awarded under the premise
that their purpose is to “punish the Defendant for his willful or malicious
conduct and to deter others from similar behavior.”129
The Third Circuit has noted that “punitive damages in general re-
present a limited remedy, to be reserved for special circumstances.”130
This inquiry—whether the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently egregious to
justify punitive damages—“ultimately focus[es] on the actor’s state of
mind.”131  For instance, a court may examine if the defendant’s offense
included “nonviolent crimes [because they] are less serious than crimes
marked by violence or the threat of violence . . . [s]imilarly, trickery and
deceit are more reprehensible than negligence.”132  The court in Schall v.
Vazquez133 explained its decision to award the plaintiff punitive damages as
follows:
Schall is entitled to punitive damages because Vazquez [defen-
dant-police officer] acted with reckless indifference towards
Schall in that he intentionally placed Schall in a position where
he was at risk of death or serious injury due to proximity of the
loaded gun to Schall’s head.  Vazquez admitted that he should
not have unholstered his weapon and the court finds that his do-
ing so was reckless with regard to Schall’s safety and personal
dignity.134
127. See Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1205 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[P]unitive
damages in general represent a limited remedy, to be reserved for special circum-
stances.” (citing Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he
punitive damage remedy must be reserved, we think, for cases in which the defen-
dant’s conduct amounts to something more than a bare violation justifying com-
pensatory damages or injunctive relief.”))).
128. See Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting
that if a court is considering reserving punitive damages, it must do so cautiously
and “turn to the record to see if the district court was correct in concluding that
the jury’s award was not the product of irrational behavior”).
129. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 n.9 (1986)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).
130. See Michel v. Levinson, 437 F. App’x 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Sava-
rese, 883 F.2d at 1205).
131. See Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 431 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Schall v.
Vazquez, 322 F. Supp. 2d 594, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holding “that a defendant’s
state of mind and not the egregious conduct is determinative in awarding punitive
damages in a civil rights case” (citation omitted)).
132. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576 (1996) (citation
omitted).
133. 322 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
134. See id. at 603. But see Odato v. Vargo, 677 F. Supp. 384, 386 (W.D. Pa.
1988).  In Odato, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-police official had de-
prived him of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable
seizure because the defendant arrested him without probable cause and used ex-
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Interestingly, even in a case like Schall, where the police official “intention-
ally placed [the plaintiff] in a position where he was at risk of death or
serious injury” the court only found that the defendant was reckless.135
While recklessness is a sufficient basis for a court to award a plaintiff puni-
tive damages,136 it is insufficient to trigger section 8550’s indemnification
prohibition, which requires “actual malice or willful misconduct.”137
In Pettit, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania considered the
relationship between a punitive damages award and section § 8550’s “will-
ful misconduct” requirement.138  Specifically, the court held that “an
award of punitive damages is not, by itself, sufficient to establish willful
misconduct, because reckless conduct can be sufficient to support such an
award.”139  Instead, the court should look at the specific instructions given
to (or questions asked of) the jury to determine whether the punitive dam-
ages award necessarily depended upon a finding of willful misconduct.
For example, to determine whether to award punitive damages, a judge
may ask the jury “do you find that defendant’s conduct was malicious, wan-
ton, or oppressive.”140  Yet, even if the jury responds affirmatively, it is not
cessive force in so doing.  The United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania denied the plaintiff punitive damages, reasoning as follows:
(1) there is no competent evidence that either police officer engaged in
this type of conduct on a previous occasion; (2) their conduct was not
sufficiently callous; (3) deterrence is not an issue here, and (4) funda-
mental constitutional rights will not be denigrated absent an award of
exemplary damages.
Id. (citation omitted).
135. See Schall, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
136. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).  When a jury does award a
plaintiff punitive damages, the court will still evaluate the reasonableness of a jury’s
decision to award a specific amount of punitive damages by assessing the following
factors: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the
disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages
awarded and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”  Dee
v. Borough of Dunmore, 474 F. App’x 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Gore, 517 U.S.
559).  For example, in a Third Circuit case where police officers discriminated
against a female police officer due to her sex, “[d]efendants challenged the exces-
siveness of the punitive damages award by arguing that it was disproportionate to
other awards in similar cases.” See Keenan v. City of Phila., 983 F.2d 459, 471 (3d
Cir. 1992).  Rejecting the defendant’s argument, the court upheld the punitive
damages award, noting “[w]e do not find that these awards, as remitted and spread
over four individuals, so grossly excessive as to shock our judicial conscience.” See
id. at 472.  In comparison, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania dismissed a punitive damages award where the plaintiff did not
suffer any actual harm and the defendant’s actions were actually in good faith to
try to handle citizen’s complaints. See Carroll v. Clifford Twp., 21 F. Supp. 3d 398,
402–03 (M.D. Pa. 2014), aff’d, 625 F. App’x 43 (3d Cir. 2015).
137. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8550 (West, Westlaw through 2017
Act 22).  Of course, if the defendant was convicted of a crime because he was
reckless then § 8550 would prohibit indemnification. Id.
138. See Pettit v. Namie, 931 A.2d 790, 798 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007).
139. See id. at 801 (citing Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1994)).
140. See, e.g., id. at 802.
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clear that section 8550’s willful conduct requirement is met because the
jury could have found that the defendant’s conduct was malicious or wan-
ton.141  Furthermore, under Pennsylvania law wanton conduct does not
reach the level of willful or malicious conduct.142  Section 8550’s indemni-
fication prohibition only applies when there is a judicial determination
that the defendant has engaged in conduct that constituted a crime, actual
fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct.143  On the other hand, if it is
clear from the jury instructions or interrogatories that the jury awarded
punitive damages because it found the defendant engaged in malicious or
willful conduct then, in that case, the punitive damages determination
would preclude the municipality from indemnifying the police official be-
cause section 8550’s elements would be met.144  There would have been
(1) a judicial determination (2) that the defendant engaged in willful or
malicious conduct.  In short, a punitive damages award neither necessi-
tates nor precludes a finding of willful conduct for indemnification
purposes.
Furthermore, none of the underlying § 1983 issues discussed in the
preceding sections—a Fourth Amendment deprivation, a qualified immu-
nity dispute, a punitive damages award—necessarily leads to a conclusion
that the defendant engaged in willful misconduct under section 8550,
which would prohibit indemnification.  Section 1983 determinations sim-
ply do not dictate Philadelphia’s indemnification determinations in most
circumstances.  Perhaps an equally—if not a more likely—reason Penn-
sylvania’s indemnification statutes is inapplicable is the prevalence of set-
tlement in § 1983 litigation.145
6. Settlement and a “Judicial Determination”
The City of Philadelphia settles approximately 50% of § 1983 cases
against Philadelphia police officials.146  As a general matter, a settlement
does not necessarily mean that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a
141. See id. at 804.
142. See id. at 801.
143. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8550 (West, Westlaw through
2017 Act 22).
144. See, e.g., Keenan v. City of Phila., 936 A.2d 566, 569–70 (Pa. Commw Ct.
2007) (“The evidence submitted by the City, namely, the jury instructions and ver-
dict sheet, was sufficient to prove a judicial determination that Keenan engaged in
willful misconduct and was not entitled to indemnification because of the limita-
tions set forth in Section 8550 of the Act.”).
145. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Re-
lated Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 459, 459 (2004)
(showing percentage of federal civil cases tried dropped from 11.5% to 1.8% be-
tween 1962 and 2002); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31
UCLA L. REV. 72, 89 (1983) (stating about 8% of civil suits filed in state and fed-
eral courts went to trial).
146. See E-mail from Armando Brigandi, Chief Deputy City Solicitor, City of
Phila., Civil Rights Unit to Teressa E. Ravenell, Professor of Law, Villanova Univer-
sity Charles Widger School of Law (July 18, 2017) (on file with author).
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constitutional right or that the amount negotiated accurately captures the
plaintiff’s harm.147  Nevertheless, the parties may choose to settle when
they consider one or more of the following “three key drivers of settlement
behavior: costly adjudication, risk aversion, and divergent prior beliefs or
information.”148  For example, in Williams v. City of Philadelphia,149 the City
of Philadelphia settled a § 1983 case for a mid-six figure number prior to
trial.150  After losing a motion for summary judgment, settlement was a
sensible choice for the defendant—the outcome of the case was less cer-
tain and trial necessarily increased litigation costs.  As for the plaintiff, al-
though this matter settled for far less than what a typical wrongful death
case would normally settle for, the plaintiff also faced an uncertain out-
come and increased costs—not only are Monell claims notoriously difficult
to prove but, a similar case had ended in jury finding that the city was not
liable under § 1983.151
Regardless of why parties choose to settle a case rather than end the
case through adjudication, this affects a municipality’s obligation to in-
demnify its employee.  Under section 8548, a municipality is only required
to indemnify its employee when “it is judicially determined that an act of the
employee caused the injury and such act was, or that the employee in
good faith reasonably believed that such act was, within the scope of his
office or duties.”152  A settlement is markedly different from a judicial ad-
judication.  Settlement agreements are enforced “according to principles
of contract law.”153  And Pennsylvania courts favor settlements, in part,
because they minimize courts’ involvement, thereby reducing the costs
147. Prescott and Spier explain the “benefit” of settlement as follows:
Most people recognize that parties fully settle a dispute only if the pro-
posed agreement is mutually beneficial.  Mutual benefit, however, has a
precise meaning in this context.  It does not mean that the result was fair
in any absolute sense.  It also does not mean that the result was socially
beneficial.  Nor does it mean that both, or even one, of the parties will be
“satisfied” with the outcome.
J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 59, 68–69 (2016).
148. See id. at 71.
149. See Armando Brigandi, Chief Deputy City Solicitor, City of Phila., at Nor-
man J. Shachoy Symposium: Making Policy Pay? (Oct. 28, 2016) (transcript availa-
ble with the Villanova Law Review) (describing Williams v. City of Philadelphia).
150. See id.  An off-duty Philadelphia police officer, Rudolph Gary, shot and
killed Howard Williams during a dispute. Id.  Specifically, Gary pointed his gun at
Howard Williams and shot him point blank in the neck, then stood over top of the
fallen Williams and shot him two more times. Id.  Gary was arrested by Philadel-
phia Police shortly after the incident. Id.  He was convicted of murder and is
currently serving a 40-year sentence. Id.  The City refused to indemnify Gary. Id.
151. Id.
152. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8548 (West, Westlaw through 2017
Act 22) (emphasis added).
153. See Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Hempfield Twp. Mun. Auth., 916 A.2d 1183,
1188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
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and burdens litigation places.154  Typically, a settlement is enforceable,
not because a court deems it is fair or just, but because all of the elements
of a contract—offer, acceptance, and consideration—are present.155
While perhaps not the complete opposite, a settlement clearly differs from
a judicial determination.  A settlement is not the consequence of a judge’s
or a jury’s deliberations but the reflection of a bargain between two parties
“after due reflection of the possible consequences of his bargain.”156  Im-
portantly, absent a judicial determination, a municipal agency is not re-
quired to indemnify its employee.  This means that whenever a § 1983
claim ends in a settlement, the city is not statutorily bound to indemnify its
employee.
C. Contractually Bound—Settlements, Police Union Agreements, and
Municipal Indemnification Decisions.
As discussed in the previous sections, the way in which § 1983 and
indemnification statutes intersect means that in many cases Philadelphia
will not be statutorily bound to indemnify its police officials.  This, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean that they are not obligated to indemnify
Philadelphia police officials.  The obligation, however, may come from a
different source.  Part I(C) considers two sources of contractual obliga-
tion: settlement agreements and collective bargaining agreements.
1. Settlement Agreements
As noted in the previous section, under Pennsylvania law, settlement
agreements are governed by contract law.  Accordingly, where there is an
offer, acceptance, and consideration, the court will enforce the settlement
agreement absent fraud, duress, or mutual mistake.157  Whether indem-
nity matters will depend largely on whom enters into the settlement agree-
ment—the individual officer, the city, or both—and the exact terms of the
agreement.  If the settlement is between the plaintiff and the individual
officer, indemnification matters, especially if the defendant is unable per-
sonally to satisfy the judgment.  If, however, the city is a party to the settle-
ment agreement then, presumably the city will be responsible for the
agreed-upon amount owed the plaintiff.  Given their contractual nature,
settlement agreements will vary from case to case.  However, most savvy
plaintiff’s attorneys will not enter into a settlement with a defendant with-
out some guarantee that the defendant will be able to pay the agreed
upon amount, either through his employer or insurer.  Accordingly, ques-
154. See Felix v. Giuseppe Kitchens & Baths, Inc., 848 A.2d 943, 946 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2004) (“There is a strong judicial policy in favor of voluntarily settling
lawsuits . . . . [S]ettlement reduces the burden on and expense of maintaining
courts.” (citing Rothman v. Fillette, 469 A.2d 543, 546 (Pa. 1983))).
155. See Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick,
587 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Pa. 1991).
156. See New Charter Coal Co. v. McKee, 191 A.2d 830, 833 (Pa. 1963).
157. See Felix, 848 A.2d at 946.
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tions of indemnity will rarely be at issue when the parties have settled their
§ 1983 dispute—the parties typically will agree to how the settlement will
be satisfied during their negotiations.158
2. Collective Bargaining Agreements
Collective bargaining agreements offer another plausible explanation
for widespread indemnification absent statutory obligation.  Although col-
lective bargaining was unavailable to public sector employees until the
1960s, functional police unions began forming long before they were for-
mally authorized.159  The largest of these was, and remains, the Fraternal
Order of Police (FOP), which has about 330,000 members.160  By its own
account, the FOP was created for the purpose of presenting police of-
ficers’ grievances to their respective city councils.161  Although the FOP is
more than 100 years old, police departments could not legally unionize
under state laws until the 1960s.162  Like other unions, police unions are
formed when members of the department seek out a union organizer,
garner support for unionizing, and hold a vote or election to officially
158. One exception to this is if a police officer-defendant enters into a settle-
ment with the plaintiff, the officer pays, and then seeks indemnification from his
or her municipal employer.  However, this is very unlikely because municipalities
often represent their police officials in civil litigation. See infra Part I(C)(2).
159. Even after Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,
police departments could not form outright unions as we know them today be-
cause the National Labor Relations Act exempted public employers.  National La-
bor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).  Nevertheless, police departments
circumvented statutory obstacles by creating “fraternal organizations.” See Joanne
Klein, History of Police Unions, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE 2207, 2207 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2014).
160. See Frequently Asked Questions, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, http://www
.fop.net/Faq.aspx [https://perma.cc/DNK5-HPW5] (last visited June 25, 2017).
161. See id.
162. See Developments in the Law—Public Employment: Collective Bargaining in the
Public Sector, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1676, 1677 (1984).  For instance, in 1970, Penn-
sylvania passed its Public Employee Relations Act, which made it lawful for public
employees, including police officers, to engage in organization and collective bar-
gaining. See 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.401 (West, Westlaw through
2017 Act 22); see also id. § 217.1.  Section 217.1 of Pennsylvania’s statute states as
follows:
Policemen or firemen employed by a political subdivision of the Com-
monwealth or by the Commonwealth shall, through labor organizations
or other representatives designated by fifty percent or more of such po-
licemen or firemen, have the right to bargain collectively with their pub-
lic employers concerning the terms and conditions of their employment,
including compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement, pen-
sions and other benefits, and shall have the right to an adjustment or
settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of
this act.
43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 217.1.  An overwhelming majority of states
enacted similar statutes, and today most police departments, as well as individual
officers are free to join the FOP or other existing unions, or create their own. See
Marcia L. McCormick, Our Uneasiness with Police Unions: Power and Voice for the Power-
ful?, 35 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 47, 53 (2015).
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss5/1
2017] THE BLURRED BLUE LINE 865
form a union.163  If the outcome of the vote is favorable, members choose
union leaders and the collective bargaining process begins.164
The negotiation process between a police union and its respective
municipality may lead to disagreements between the two.165  Given the
numerous elements typical of a police union contract, it is not surprising
that the negotiation process can be painstaking.  Contracts between police
unions and cities typically contain clauses regarding grievance procedures,
wages, leave, holidays, and uniforms.166  However, there are a few distinc-
tive terms in police union agreements, such as the Law Enforcement Of-
ficers’ Bill of Rights, which aims to protect officers’ due process rights, and
163. See 4 Steps to Form a Union, AFL-CIO, https://aflcio.org/form-union/4-
steps-form-union [https://perma.cc/X9EV-HBB3] (last visited June 25, 2017).
164. See id.  Although unionizing police departments is generally a straightfor-
ward process, relationships between municipalities and police departments can be-
come strained due, in part, to the burgeoning power of police unions.
Organizations such as the FOP no longer maintain only their original, simple goals
of fair working conditions and adequate pay, but have since expanded their ef-
forts.  One of the FOP’s primary pursuits is now “legislative advocacy.” See Steve
Young Law Enforcement Legislative Advocacy Center, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE,
http://www.fop.net/CmsPage.aspx?id=34 [https://perma.cc/6J7W-HCRZ] (last
visited June 25, 2017).  That is, the FOP is vigorously engaged in lobbying against
or in favor of legislation or reform efforts which coincide or conflict with its mem-
bers’ interests. See id.  Furthermore, police unions typically have political action
committees (PACs), which allow their members to exert political influence by pro-
viding monetary support to candidates running for office. See Political Action Com-
mittee, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, http://www.fop.net/PAC/PAC.aspx?id=206
[https://perma.cc/L64V-JBNA] (last visited June 25, 2017).  The political clout
garnered by these efforts contributes to the tension that arises between a union
and its respective city or municipality when the two are in disagreement. See, e.g.,
Amy Yensi, War of Words Between City Police Union and Baltimore Police Department,
CBS BALT. (June 21, 2017, 11:21 PM), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/ 2017/06/
21/city-police-union-baltimore-police-department/ [https://perma.cc/J67G-
NSR5].  This is evidenced by clashes between the police unions and city leader-
ship. See, e.g., Nisha Chittal, NYC Mayor and Police Union Chief Clash over Garner
Decision, MSNBC (Dec. 4, 2014, 11:00 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/gar-
ner-tensions-rise-between-nyc-mayor-and-police-union-head [https://perma.cc/
QDR9-SDFZ] (describing tensions between NYPD and Mayor DeBlasio following
the death of Eric Garner).
165. Although it is not the norm, negotiations can last for years and even spur
litigation. See, e.g., Roseann Moring, Police Union Oks Labor Contract with City, End-
ing Years of Contentious Negotiations, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Mar. 14, 2017), http:/
/www.omaha.com/news/crime/police-union-oks-labor-contract-with-city-ending
years-of/article_7c797df3-488e-57e5-a460-9eaa5b6c8bd7.html [https://perma.cc/
5488-5UBB] (describing negotiations between the city of Omaha and its police
union); Rocco Parascandola & Erin Durkin, New York City Reaches Contract Deal with
Largest Police Union, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017, 08:27 PM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/new-york/city-reaches-contract-deal-largest-union-sources-article-1.2960
734 [https://perma.cc/54Q4-MZGN] (describing negotiations between NYPD and
the New York City).
166. See, e.g., CONTRACT BETWEEN PHILADELPHIA AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF
POLICE LODGE NO. 5 FOR THE TERM JULY 1, 2009 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2014 1, 47–77
(2009), https://www.muckrock.com/foi/philadelphia-211/police-union-contract-
philadelphia-police-department-18497/#file-49316 [https://perma.cc/994C-
TXFF] [hereinafter Philadelphia PD CBA].
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no-strike clauses.167  Additionally, some police union contracts and FOP
agreements contain officer indemnification clauses.168  While indemnifi-
cation clauses are not found in every contract, they are certainly not
uncommon.
Among contracts that do require the municipality to indemnify of-
ficers in the event of civil suit, the extent to which police officers must be
represented or compensated varies.  For instance, some agreements, such
as those for police unions in Laredo, Texas, Corpus Christi, Texas, and
Jacksonville, Florida, only require that the city provide and pay for legal
defense for officers who are sued in connection with any of his or her
actions within the scope of employment.169  On the other hand, several
contracts require that the city provide legal defense and reimburse officers
for any monetary judgments against them.170  These types of indemnifica-
tion clauses are not without nuance, however.  Some contracts limit com-
pensation to actual damages and exempt punitive damages from
coverage.171  Others place a cap on the dollar amount of damages the city
is obligated to pay for each employee indemnified.172  An alternative
method of limiting indemnification, used by Minneapolis, is to simply ref-
erence the same statutory limits found in state legislation.173
Additionally, most agreements qualify that the officer must have been
acting within the scope of his or employment and in good faith in order to
receive the benefit of indemnification.  In Newark, New Jersey, for in-
stance, if there is a claim for punitive damages, the city will defend and
167. See Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1209–1212
(2017).
168. See id. at 1198.
169. See AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI AND THE CORPUS
CHRISTI POLICE ASSOCIATION: AUG. 1, 2010 TO JULY 31, 2015 1, 55 (2010), http://
www.cctexas.com/Assets/Departments/Human-Resources/Files/ExecutedCCPOA
FinalContract.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q49J-QPE9]; AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY
OF JACKSONVILLE AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE: OCT. 1, 2011–SEPT. 30,
2014 1, 106 (2011), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3259981-Jack-
sonville-FL.html [https:// perma.cc/4N3S-LPL7]; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF LAREDO AND THE LAREDO POLICE OFFICER’S
ASSOCIATION: OCT. 1, 2008 TO SEPT. 30, 2016 1, 54 (2012), https://www.muckrock
.com/foi/laredo-2908/police-union-contract-laredo-police-department-18914/#
file-48248 [https://perma.cc/6ZV8-U26N].
170. See, e.g., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG AND SUN
COAST POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION: OCT. 1, 2016 THROUGH SEPT. 30, 2019 50,
51 (2016), https://www.stpete.org/city_departments/human_resources/docs/
PBA%20Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XRJ-YVXF].
171. See, e.g., id. at 1, 50.
172. See, e.g., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF MADISON AND MADISON PROFES-
SIONAL POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION: JAN. 1, 2016 TO DEC. 31, 2017 1, 46 (2016),
https://www.cityofmadison.com/sites/default/files/city-of-madison/human-re-
sources/documents/contracts/MPPOA-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L82-EGG3].
173. See LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS AND THE PO-
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defray the officer’s costs only if it is determined that the officer was not
acting recklessly or without the scope of employment.174  If the officer is
found to have been reckless or wanton, he or she is advised to retain sepa-
rate counsel for the punitive damages claim.175  While most contracts fol-
low this general framework, others provide officers with an additional
layer of protection by allowing and funding arbitration after the city makes
its initial determination that the officer is not entitled to
indemnification.176
Still, some police union contracts simply do not have indemnification
provisions.  That is, the city is not required to indemnify police officers
beyond what is statutorily mandated.  For example, the contract between
the City of Philadelphia and the FOP does not contain an indemnification
clause.177  Accordingly, Philadelphia is not contractually bound by its po-
lice union agreement to indemnify its officers if the officer is found liable
under § 1983.178  The ways in which indemnification law, § 1983 jurispru-
dence, and contractual agreements interact in Philadelphia give munici-
pal decision-making officials an enormous amount of discretion when it
comes to deciding whether or not to indemnify police officers for alleged
constitutional violations.
II. EXERCISING DISCRETION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN § 1983
POLICE INDEMNIFICATION DECISIONS
The Philadelphia Police Department currently employs about 6,500
uniformed police officers.179  The number of officer-civilian encounters in
Philadelphia per year is over 200,000.180  Of those encounters, about
40,000 result in actual arrests.181  On a per-year average, approximately
200–250 federal civil rights lawsuits are filed against Philadelphia police
174. See AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY AND THE PO-
LICE SUPERIOR OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION OF NEWARK, NJ, INC.: JAN. 1, 2009 THROUGH
DEC. 31, 2012 1, 29 (2009), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
3259927-Newark-NJ.html [https://perma.cc/C4VX-ETAG].
175. See id.
176. See, e.g., MASTER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF DETROIT AND THE DE-
TROIT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION: 2014–2019 1, 44 (2014), https://www. docu-
mentcloud.org/documents/3259922-Detroit-MI.html [https://perma.cc/ELN5-
ZZUK].
177. See Philadelphia PD CBA, supra note 166.
178. See City of Phila. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, Am. Arb.
Ass’n No. 14, 360 L 00202 09, 21 (2009) (Jennings, Jarin & De Treux, Arbs.),
http://www.lehb.org/contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QTW-DZ2P].  However,
the contract does provide that the City will contribute 2.5 million dollars to the
FOP legal services fund. See id.
179. See E-mail from Armando Brigandi, Chief Deputy City Solicitor, City of
Phila., Civil Rights Unit to Teressa E. Ravenell, Professor of Law, Villanova Univer-
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officials.182  As discussed in Part I, decision-making officials in Philadel-
phia have a tremendous amount of discretion when it comes to decisions
to indemnify police officials.183  However, out of all of these 200–250 fed-
eral lawsuits, the City of Philadelphia indemnifies 99% of the officers who
are liable.184
In the rare cases where the municipality decides to deny an officer
indemnification, it is almost always because the officer engaged in crimi-
nal or willful misconduct.185  Clearly, under section 8550, the municipality
does not even have the option of indemnifying a police official when a
judge or jury has determined he or she engaged in criminal conduct.  Fur-
thermore, section 8548 only requires a Pennsylvania municipality to in-
demnify an official when there has been a judicial determination that the
official caused the injury in the scope of his or her employment (or under
the good faith belief that he or she was acting within the scope of his or
her employment).  Although the City has a great deal of discretion regard-
ing questions of police indemnification, the City traditionally only uses
this discretion to deny indemnification when there is little question that
the police official has engaged in criminal conduct.186
One question to consider is whether the City should limit the circum-
stances in which it indemnifies government officials being sued under
§ 1983.  The decision to indemnify or not indemnify a police official has
the potential to affect a number of different persons: the plaintiff, the
defendant police official, and residents of the City.  To this end, Part II
discusses the primary policy considerations that should factor into munici-
pal decisions to indemnify police officers as well as the dilemmas munici-
pal officials face as they decide whether or not to indemnify police
officials.  Part A argues that indemnification encourages people to become
police officers and for police officials to act.  Part B considers how indem-
nification might reduce constitutional violations.  Part C discusses the im-
portance of indemnification for plaintiff compensation.  Part D considers
the special problem of officer recidivism.  Finally, Part E discusses how
indemnification shifts costs to municipal residents.  Part II concludes that
consideration of all of these policy concerns will generally weigh in favor
182. See id.
183. See supra Part I and accompanying notes.
184. See E-mail from Armando Brigandi to Teressa E. Ravenell, supra note
179.  Currently, Philadelphia settles approximately 50% of § 1983 claims against its
officers, 40% are dismissed before trial, and 10% go to trial. See id.
185. Similarly, when corporations refuse to indemnify an officer or director it
is often because he or she engaged in a criminal act or willful misconduct. See, e.g.,
2 William E. Knepper & Dan A. Bailey, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DI-
RECTORS 297–98 (5th ed. 1993) (“Public policy prohibits indemnification of corpo-
rate officers for intentional illegal conduct.”).
186. See E-mail from Armando Brigandi to Teressa E. Ravenell, supra note
179.  For example, in Panas v. City of Philadelphia, the City of Philadelphia refused
to indemnify Frank Tepper because Tepper, a former police official, had been
convicted of murdering Panas.  For additional discussion of the Panas case, see
infra notes 221–26 and accompanying text.
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of indemnifying police officials; however, police indemnification should
correlate to adjustments in department policy, improved training, and
discipline.
A. Incentivizing Police
Police officers in the United States play an integral role in society,
both protecting and serving the public.  As Chicago’s Police Accountabil-
ity Task Force noted in its Recommendation for Reform,
serving as a police officer is a challenging and often dangerous
job . . . . [W]e put significant pressure on them to solve and pre-
vent crime and to address the manifestations of a number of
other daunting social and economic challenges beyond their
charge and capacity to manage, let alone solve.187
While most police officers make a decent salary, their pay scale in no way
reflects the dangers and complexities of their jobs.188  And still, Philadel-
phia employs more than 6,500 officers.189  The overwhelming majority of
law enforcement officers in Philadelphia care deeply about their commu-
nities, and they take their jobs seriously.
Nevertheless, many officers serving in Philadelphia will be sued at
some point during their careers.190  “[A]lthough the risk of an official los-
ing a case is extremely small . . . the risk of being sued is far greater, and
even successful defenses can exact heavy personal costs from officials.”191
The government, including police departments, needs to attract talented
individuals to work for it.192  The Court concluded in Filarsky v. Delia193
that the fear of defending a civil suit, compounded with the risk of per-
sonal liability, may dissuade people from becoming government offi-
187. See POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASKFORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM:
RESTORING TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY
SERVE 2 (Apr. 2016), https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/
PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM4W-Q6EJ].
188. See E-mail from Armando Brigandi to Teressa E. Ravenell supra note 179
(estimating that the median annual salary for a Philadelphia police officer is
$60,000 to $65,000).
189. See id.
190. As noted at the beginning of Part II, Philadelphia employs about 6,500
police officials and approximately 200 federal civil rights lawsuits are filed against
Philadelphia police officials each year.  Based on these numbers, about 3% of Phil-
adelphia’s police officers will have a § 1983 claim brought against them each year.
Although some officers will be sued repeatedly, most of these defendants should
change from year to year.  This suggests that many police officials will be sued at
least once during the course their careers.
191. See SCHUCK, supra note 21, at 70.
192. See Filarksy v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 390 (2012) (“The government’s need
to attract talented individuals is not limited to full-time public employees.”).
193. 556 U.S. 377 (2012).
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cials.194  Indemnification, like immunity, shields officers from incurring
the costs of litigation.  Following the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Filar-
sky, advanced knowledge that they will be indemnified in most circum-
stances reduces the likelihood that people will refuse to become police
officers because of the fear of liability.
Indemnification may also have a positive effect on persons currently
serving as police officials.  In Harlow, the Supreme Court recognized that
“there is the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties.’”195  Because indemnification
shields officers from personally incurring the financial costs of litigation in
most circumstances it, like immunity, should protect their ardor.196  Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has reasoned that the purpose of
indemnification “is to permit local agency employees to perform their offi-
cial duties without fear of personal liability.”197  Additionally, by providing
indemnification, the city’s executive leaders send a message to law en-
forcement that “we have your backs”, and “your work is appreciated.”
This, in turn, improves officer morale.
B. Reducing Constitutional Deprivations
One of the basic purposes of § 1983 is to deter government officials
from committing constitutional torts.198  As a general matter deterrence
works by penalizing unwanted behaviors.199  For deterrence to work, the
affected parties must have advance knowledge that they will be punished
194. See id. at 390.  In Filarsky, the Court considered whether to extend quali-
fied immunity to a private defendant acting on behalf of the government. See id.
In holding that qualified immunity should be available to the private defendant
the Court reasoned, without qualified immunity, “the most talented candidates will
decline public engagements” in favor of “other work— that does not expose them
to liability for government actions.” See id.; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 814 (1982) (noting that one social cost of § 1983 litigation is the “deterrence
of able citizens from acceptance of public office”).
195. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
196. But see Schwartz, supra note 7, at 941–42 (“Even if an officer believes he
will be indemnified, he may not want his conduct to impose costs on taxpayers or
his employer.  He may fear that he will be disciplined or denied promotion if he is
named in multiple suites.  He may fear having to participate in future depositions
or trials.  And each of these concerns may ‘erode [officers’] necessary confidence
and willingness to act.’” (footnotes omitted)).
197. See Wiehagen v. Borough of N. Braddock, 594 A.2d 303, 306 (Pa. 1991).
198. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980) (“[Section]
1983 was intended not only to provide compensation to the victims of past abuses,
but to serve as a deterrent against future constitutional deprivations, as well.” (cita-
tion omitted)).
199. See Deterrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.) (defining deterrence
as “the prevention of criminal behavior by fear of punishment”).
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for engaging in the behavior.200  Deterrence works by not only dissuading
the specific individual punished from engaging in similar conduct in the
future but also by dissuading similarly situated officials from engaging in
comparable conduct.  Thus, if police officials are personally liable for their
constitutional torts then, theoretically, they (individually and as a whole)
will be less likely to engage in unconstitutional behavior.  From this, some
scholars argue that indemnification undermines deterrence because if po-
lice officials are not personally liable for their behaviors they have little
disincentive from engaging in those behaviors in the future.201
Notwithstanding the power of financial liability as a deterrent, some
argue that personal liability is not necessary to reduce constitutional viola-
tions.  Professor Barbara Armacost has argued that “an official who is
found personally liable in a § 1983 suit is, by definition, a ‘wrongdoer’
[and] there is significant independent value—apart from who actually
pays the damages award—in attaching the label ‘wrongdoer’ to an individ-
ual official.”202  She goes on to suggest that there is a “stigma” that fastens
to police officials who are found liable for § 1983 damages, even if the
municipality indemnifies them.
The difficulty with this argument is that most § 1983 claims against
police officials in Philadelphia are settled—there is no judicial determina-
tion of wrongdoing.203  And while anecdotal evidence indicates that many
police officers take it personally when they are sued,204 it is unclear that
the same type of moral blame attaches when a § 1983 case is settled rather
than litigated.  In fact, police officials often become very upset when they
find out that the city has settled with the plaintiff precisely because they do
not believe that they should be liable and settlement deprives them of the
opportunity to prove this.205  A municipality’s decision to settle a § 1983
claim may be strategic rather than fault-based.206  In some instances it will
be more cost efficient and practical for the municipality to settle the claim
rather than litigate it (at least in the short term), even if liability is ques-
tionable.207  While personal liability may not be necessary to deter police
200. See Ellen S. Podgor, What Kind of Mad Prosecutor Brought Us This White
Collar Case, 41 VT. L. REV. 523, 535 (2017) (“The law cannot achieve specific and
general deterrence without giving fair warning that certain conduct is criminal.”).
201. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 7, at 953 (concluding that indemnification
“frustrates § 1983’s deterrence goals by limiting the impact of compensatory and
punitive damages awards on individual officers”).
202. See Armacost, supra note 8, at 670.
203. See supra Part I(B)(6).
204. See E-mail from Armando Brigandi to Teressa E. Ravenell, supra note
179.
205. See id.
206. See supra notes 146–56 and accompanying text.
207. See id.
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misconduct, at a minimum, there needs to be some finding of misconduct.
Yet, many settlements specify that there is no admission of wrongdoing.208
Even so, there need not be a judicial determination of wrongdoing
for a municipality to take steps to reduce the number of constitutional
violations that take place in its jurisdiction.  One of the basic arguments in
support of respondeat superior liability is that it “creates an incentive for
principals to choose employees and structure work within the organization
so as to reduce the incidence of tortious conduct.  This incentive may re-
duce the incidence of tortious conduct more effectively than doctrines
that impose liability solely on an individual tortfeasor.”209  As noted in
Part I, indemnification acts similarly to respondeat superior in that the
employer pays for the misconduct of its employee.210  Peter Schuck has
argued that “the ideal locus of liability” “is probably closer to the agency
head than the individual street-level official.”211  He offers the following
explanation:
Unlike individual low-level officials, agencies control most of the
resources, constraints, incentives, and conditions that actually in-
fluence officials’ behaviors toward the public.  They can recruit
different types of personnel and train and retrain them to per-
form their duties in particular ways.  They can reward and punish
officials for conforming to and departing from those norms, and
they can develop new modes of supervision and control.212
For example, a police department may use indemnification as lever-
age to change unwanted behavior amongst its police officials.  When simi-
lar instances of misconduct arise, the Department may warn officers
(individually or collectively) that the conduct will not be tolerated and
future misconduct will not be indemnified.  If an officer is provided fair
warning that further unacceptable behavior will result in the withdrawal of
indemnification, there is a strong likelihood that that officer will alter his
course of behavior.213  Similarly, by reviewing § 1983 settlements and judi-
208. See E-mail from Armando Brigandi to Teressa E. Ravenell, supra note 179
(noting that all settlement agreements between § 1983 plaintiffs and the City of
Philadelphia contain a stipulation that there is no admission of wrongdoing).
209. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
210. See supra Part I.
211. See SCHUCK, supra note 21, at 104.
212. Id. at 104–05.  Similarly, in Owen v. City of Independence, the Court noted
that “the threat that damages might be levied against the city may encourage those
in a policymaking position to institute internal rules and programs designed to
minimize the likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights.”
445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980).
213. For example, in one police indemnification case, attorneys for the mu-
nicipality offered the following argument against police indemnification: “by re-
moving the cloak of indemnification from someone like [the defendant officer],
the corporation counsel sends a message to city policemen that their own assets
are at stake; and with their own assets at stake . . . policemen are less likely to
engage in torture.”  John Conroy, The Shocking Truth, CHI. READER (Jan. 9, 1997),
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cial determinations police departments should be able to identify prob-
lematic behaviors and determine steps to correct and reduce the number
of these occurrences.214
On the other hand, the deterrent effect of individual liability seems
far more limited.  Schuck has suggested that personal liability will only
deter willful misconduct and, because most constitutional violations are
not the result of willful behavior, will do little to reduce the overall num-
ber of constitutional deprivations.215  Similarly, in Davis v. United States216
the Supreme Court noted that,
[T]he deterrence benefits of exclusion “var[y] with the culpabil-
ity of the law enforcement conduct” at issue . . . . [W]hen the
police act with an objectively “reasonable good-faith belief” that
their conduct is lawful or when their conduct involves only sim-
ple, “isolated” negligence the “deterrence rationale loses much
of its force.”217
In short, placing liability costs on the municipality rather than the individ-
ual is more likely to reduce the overall number of constitutional depriva-
tions occurring in that jurisdiction.
https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/the-shocking-truth/Content?oid=8924
62 [https://perma.cc/NH28-WQ7G].  On the other hand, indemnification for re-
peated instances of similar misconduct may embolden officers—that no matter
what he/she does, his or her actions will be covered by the city, without
consequence.
214. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 959 (noting that “[i]f police departments
do not gather and analyze information from lawsuits and do not know how much
has been spent in settlements and judgments, they cannot asses which officers and
which types of police action lead to lawsuits.”).  This, of course, assumes that mu-
nicipalities can and do review and aggregate litigation outcomes to identify trends
in behavior and then take steps to remedy and reduce those problematic actions.
Professor Armacost argues that this is seldom the case.  She offers the following
observation:
[M]any departments do not use these materials to track broader patterns
and trends that might reveal problem officers or trouble spots in the po-
lice force.  In some cases, this failure results simply from disorganized or
fragmented record keeping or lack of computer capability.  In others, it is
more deliberate, flowing out of concerns that statistics about misconduct
could be used in litigation against the police department . . . . Obviously,
when supervisors do not discipline officers, despite lawsuits or complaints
involving police brutality, and those officers’ personnel files remain ex-
emplary, the officers have no incentive to change their behavior.
Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV 453, 474 (2004).
215. See SCHUCK, supra note 21, at 85.
216. 564 U.S. 229 (2011).
217. Id. at 238 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137, 143
(2009)).
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C. Compensating Victims of Constitutional Torts
One of the primary aims of § 1983 is to compensate plaintiffs for the
injuries inflicted upon them by government officials.218  However, if
found liable, most police officials will not be in a position to satisfy the
judgment against them.219  The decision to indemnify provides plaintiffs
with a source from which to receive monetary compensation for their al-
leged injuries.220  In contrast, when the city refuses to indemnify the de-
fendant, the plaintiff will usually not be able to recover damages, even if
he or she establishes the police official is liable.
For example, in Panas v. City of Philadelphia,221 a jury found Frank
Tepper was liable under § 1983 for depriving Billy Panas of his right to be
free from an unreasonable seizure.222  Nevertheless, Panas’s family has re-
covered nothing.
On November 21, 2009 then-Philadelphia Police Officer Frank
Tepper . . . murdered [19-year-old] Billy Panas following a scuffle
between some of Tepper’s family and friends and a group of
neighborhood youths in front of Tepper’s house.  Tepper was
off-duty at the time . . . .  Tepper had been drinking, and when
he shot and killed Panas . . . .
Prior to shooting Panas, Tepper exited the house, flashed
his badge, identified himself as a police officer, and asked the
218. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980) (“A damages
remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicat-
ing cherished constitutional guarantees . . . .”)  As Professor Dobbs has explained
“[c]ompensation of injured person is one of the generally accepted aims of tort
law.  Payment of compensation to injured persons is desirable.  If a person has
been wronged by a defendant, it is just that the defendant make compensation.”
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 17 (2000).
219. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
603, 606 (2006) (“[M]any Americans are ‘judgment proof’: They lack the suffi-
cient assets (or sufficient collectible assets) to pay the judgment in full (or even in
substantial part).”).  The one exception to this is if the employee has obtained
individual liability insurance.  “Liability insurance, specifically, protects the insured
in the event he is sued on a legal claim covered by the policy, at which point the
insurer typically has both a right and duty to defend the suit.”  John Rappaport,
How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1552 (2017).
Generally, “[l]iability insurance (or third party insurance) is insurance that you
purchase to cover your responsibility for harms you inflict on others.  Although
liability insurance can cover negligent acts, it will not, and likely cannot, cover
intentional (that is, criminal) acts.”  Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST.
L. REV. 721, 735 (2012).  With regards to police liability insurance, the insurer
typically agrees to cover losses “resulting from law enforcement wrongful act(s)
which arise out of and are committed during the course and scope of law enforce-
ment activities.”  Rappaport, supra, at 1571 (internal quotations omitted).  This will
include intentional acts but will exclude malicious or criminal acts. See id.
220. Indemnification, like respondeat superior liability, “reflects the likeli-
hood that an employer will be more likely to satisfy a judgment.” See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY, supra note 209, at § 2.04.
221. 871 F. Supp. 2d 370 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
222. See id. at 371; see also Brigandi, supra note 149 (discussing case in detail).
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hostile crowd to disperse.  When Billy Panas said, “he won’t shoot
anybody,” Tepper replied, “oh yeah?,” pointed the gun at Panas,
and shot him point-blank in the chest.  Later that night, doctors
at Temple University Hospital pronounced Panas dead.223
Tepper was arrested and later convicted of murder.  A § 1983 civil
rights lawsuit followed.  The plaintiff sued Tepper in his personal capacity
and the City of Philadelphia.  The complaint alleged that the City failed to
supervise and discipline Tepper for repeated off-duty infractions.224  At
trial, the jury found that Tepper was personally liable under § 1983 but
that the City was not.225  The jury awarded the Panas family a verdict of
$4.7 million dollars against Tepper.226  However, the Panas family has re-
ceived nothing.227  Under section 8550, the City of Philadelphia is prohib-
ited from indemnifying Tepper—a jury had convicted Tepper of murder.
And in jail and penniless, Tepper was in no position to fulfill the
judgment.
In the absence of indemnification, plaintiffs will often be left with very
limited remedies—successful municipal liability claims are rare and most
individual defendants will not have the personal means to satisfy a substan-
tial judgment.228  One of the primary purposes of § 1983—compensating
223. Panas, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
224. Between 1995 and 2002 Tepper had been involved in at least four off-
duty altercations, most of which included him being drunk, and threatening peo-
ple with guns.  However, Tepper had a clean disciplinary history between 2002 and
the Panas murder in 2009. See Panas, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 371–75.
225. At trial, the jury was asked four separate questions on the verdict slip: (1)
Was Frank Tepper a state actor under color of law?  The jury answered yes.  (2)
Did Frank Tepper use excessive force against Billy Panas?  The jury answered yes.
(3) Was the City deliberately indifferent to the need to supervise and discipline
Frank Tepper?  The jury answered yes. (4) Finally, was the City the moving force
(the cause) behind Frank Tepper’s excessive use of force?  The jury answered no.
Regarding question four, the City argued that the seven-year period between 2002
and the 2009 when Tepper had no reported disciplinary infractions broke the cas-
ual chain.  The jury agreed with this argument. See Brigandi, supra note 149.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. But see supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text for description of Wil-
liams v. City of Philadelphia.  Additionally, without indemnification, it may be diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to find legal representation since plaintiffs’ lawyers will rarely
take a case where there is little hope of monetary recovery. See S. REP. NO. 94-1011,
at 6 (1976) (predicting that 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) will insure that civil rights statutes
do not become “mere hollow pronouncements which the average citizen cannot
enforce”).  Unfortunately, § 1988(b) does little to assuage plaintiffs’ attorneys’
concerns that they will not be compensated for their work.  Attorneys’ fees are
shifted at the discretion of the judge, and an early study of the effects of § 1988(b)
concluded that “the fees act may have lowered settlement rates and lowered the
percentage of court judgments favorable to plaintiffs.”  Stewart J. Schwab & Theo-
dore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney
Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 760–61 (1988).
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persons deprived of a constitutional right by government officials—is
clearly thwarted when the city refuses to indemnify its police officials.229
D. Officer Recidivism
Despite its many benefits, indemnification raises special concern
when certain officers are the subject of repeated and similar allegations of
abuse year after year.  There is evidence that recidivism is a problem in at
least some police departments.230  For example, the “most sued cop” in
New York City, Peter Valentin, has been sued twenty-six times in the last
ten years and the City has expended $884,000 to settle cases in which Va-
lentin was a named defendant.231  Similarly, fifty-five officers in New York
City’s police department have been sued ten or more times from 2006 to
2016.232  Philadelphia, like New York, has police officials who have been
sued multiple times based upon similar allegations.233  Nevertheless, Phila-
delphia has not refused to indemnify a police official because of the num-
ber of times the officer has been sued.234
Indemnifying police officers who repeatedly are accused of miscon-
duct may have negative effects on the individual officer, the police depart-
ment as a whole, and the municipality.  First, the individual officer may
begin to feel invincible—that no matter what the officer does, his or her
actions will be covered by the city, without consequence to the officer.  As
the Third Circuit recognized in Bielevicz v. Dubinon,235 “it is logical to as-
sume that continued official tolerance of repeated misconduct facilitates
similar unlawful actions in the future.”236  Furthermore, because punish-
ment not only deters the original actor, but other actors who are similarly
situated, different police officials may engage in future misconduct.  Pro-
fessor Armacost has argued that “if police leadership is tolerating, even
sanctioning, a kind of aggressive conduct that leads to abuses and police
leaders are willing to absorb the costs of liability, then the organization
itself is part of the problem.”237  Finally, repeated constitutional depriva-
229. The plaintiff’s interest in indemnification is further evidenced by cases
where the plaintiff, not the defendant, seeks to have the city indemnify the defen-
dant. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 1997).
230. See, e.g., Barry Paddock et al., Detective is NYPD’s Most-Sued Cop, with 28





233. See E-mail from Armando Brigandi to Teressa E. Ravenell, supra note
179.
234. See id.
235. 915 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 2017).
236. Id. at 851–52.
237. Armacost, supra note 214, at 475.
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tions may lead to municipal liability.238  Specifically, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has held that “a city
may be liable for its failure to discipline an officer after multiple com-
plaints against him, particularly where the prior conduct which the officer
engaged in is similar to the conduct which forms the basis for the suit.”239
On the other hand, an alleged constitutional deprivation (particularly
a meritorious one) presents a training opportunity for the police depart-
ment.  If the department recognizes a pattern of conduct that results in
repeated lawsuits, the department needs to be proactive.  The department
should pull this officer aside and provide counseling.  This is particularly
true for officers who repeatedly are accused of misconduct.  The recidivist
officer needs to be warned that a continuation of the pattern of behavior
that has resulted in the string allegations and civil rights lawsuits will not
be tolerated.  This is especially important as the public has become less
tolerant of police misconduct and given the clear financial link between
municipal residents and police indemnification.
E. Cost Shifting
When a municipality indemnifies a police official it is clear who is
spared the costs associated with litigation and liability—the police official.
It is not apparent who pays.  Describing police indemnification, scholars
often note that “the municipality” or “the city” assumes the costs of litiga-
tion and liability.240  Yet, as Professor Ravenell has argued elsewhere, “In-
tangible legal entities, like municipalities and corporations, at least from a
practical standpoint, are incapable of action.  Instead, a person must act
on their behalf.”241  Similarly, while technically a municipality may pay, it
must generate its funding through others.  Professor Schwartz appropri-
ately asked, “when a plaintiff recovers damages against the government,
who foots the bill?”242  She concluded that “local governments’ funding
comes from multiple sources, including property taxes; sales taxes; income
tax; utilities; charges for parking, parks, and other services; fines; interest;
238. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).  The Court in
Harris explained municipal liability for failure to train as follows:
[If] the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inade-
quacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the
policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately
indifferent to the need . . . [then] the failure to provide proper training
may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible,
and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
239. See Wnek v. City of Phila., No. 05–CV–3065, 2007 WL 1410361, at *3
(E.D. Pa. May 11, 2007) (citation omitted); see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89
F.3d 966, 967 (3d Cir. 1996).
240. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 7, at 890.
241. See Ravenell, supra note 89, at 160.
242. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police
Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1147 (2016).
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and federal and state grants.”243  With the exception of the federal and
state grants, government funding comes from the people living or visiting
the municipality.  From this, it would seem that the cost of police indemni-
fication, at least indirectly, largely falls on municipal taxpayers and those
living in the municipality and using its public services.  In short, indemnifi-
cation would seem to simply shift the cost from the police official to the
municipal government,244 and then, ultimately, to persons in the
municipality.
Arguably, because police provide a public service which benefits the
public as a whole, it is reasonable for the public to bear the cost of police
liability, at least as compared to the victim of the police action.  For exam-
ple, in Wegner v. Milwaukee Mututal Insurance Co.,245 the plaintiff’s home
sustained substantial damage after police officers used tear gas and flash
bangs to force fugitives from her home.246  The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the municipality should bear the cost of the plaintiff’s
damages.247  In so doing, it reasoned as follows:
We believe the better rule, in situations where an innocent third
party’s property is taken, damaged or destroyed by the police in
the course of apprehending a suspect, is for the municipality to
compensate the innocent party for the resulting damages.  The
policy considerations in this case center around the basic notions
of fairness and justice. At its most basic level, the issue is whether
it is fair to allocate the entire risk of loss to an innocent home-
owner for the good of the public.  We do not believe the imposi-
tion of such a burden on the innocent citizens of this state would
square with the underlying principles of our system of justice.
Therefore, the City must reimburse Wegner for the losses
sustained.248
Additionally, the court went on to hold “that the individual police officers,
who were acting in the public interest, cannot be held personally liable.
Instead, the citizens of the City should all bear the cost of the benefit
conferred.”249
243. See id. at 1161.
244. See SCHUCK, supra note 21, at 83.
245. 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991).
246. See id. at 38–39.
247. See id. at 42.
248. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST.
1965)).  Comment h of section 196 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts observes
that “the moral obligation to compensate the person whose property has been
damaged or destroyed for the public good is obviously very great, and is of the
kind which should be recognized by the law.” Id.  However, comment h goes on to
note that “the rules as to governmental immunity from suit have stood in the past
as a barrier to any effective legal remedy.” Id.
249. See Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 42.  Prosser and Keeton on Torts offers the
following observation about shifting losses:
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Although the municipality was not indemnifying a police official in
Wegner, it is useful to consider the court’s rationale regarding cost-shifting
in cases of police indemnification.  Oftentimes, when the police injure a
person the cost may fall on one of three persons: the injured individual,
the police officer, or the municipality and municipal residents.250  In the
context of Wegner—where the police damaged a person’s property for the
public good—courts have found that, among the three choices, the mu-
nicipality (i.e., the public) is best positioned to bear the cost of the
damages.
However, it is important to note that Wegner presented three innocent
parties.  In contrast, in § 1983 cases against police officials, the plaintiff is
alleging that the defendant police officer engaged in some misconduct.
And while it is entirely possible for a municipality to indemnify a police
officer without a formal finding of wrongdoing,251 this does seem to dis-
tinguish § 1983 cases from cases alleging government taking, like Wegner.
A § 1983 excessive force claim against a police officer is premised on the
idea that the police officer’s conduct was unreasonable.252  Thus, one of
the three parties—the police official—is not entirely innocent.  Yet,
through police indemnification, the municipality (arguably an innocent
party) ends up bearing the cost of the police officer’s conduct.253
Requiring the municipality to bear the cost of police action benefits
the plaintiff and the police officers; however, it may not be viewed favora-
bly by those who ultimately bear the costs of officer misconduct—munici-
pal residents.  Whether true or not, there is the perception that the cost of
Another factor courts have considered in weighing the interests before
them is the relative ability of the respective parties to bear a loss which
must necessarily fall upon one or the other, at least initially.  This is not
so much a matter of their respective wealth . . . .  Rather it is a matter of
their capacity to avoid the loss or to absorb it, or to pass it along and
distribute it in smaller portions among a larger group.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 24 (5th ed. 1984).
250. Some municipalities have insurance, in which case the insurance com-
pany will cover the cost of police liability. See Rappaport, supra note 219, at 1542
(“Municipalities nationwide purchase insurance to indemnify themselves against
liability for the acts of their law enforcement officers”).  However, coverage of
course depends on the municipality paying insurance premiums, a cost ultimately
borne by municipal residents. See Schwartz, supra note 242, at 1161.
251. See supra Part I(B)(6) for a discussion on settlements.
252. See supra Part I(B) for a discussion on the Fourth Amendment standard.
253. One might argue that the municipality is not entirely innocent because it
hired the defendant police official.  However, as discussed in Part I, it is clear that
the municipality will not be held liable under § 1983 simply for hiring a tortfeasor.
Rather, § 1983 municipal liability requires that the municipality cause the plaintiff
to be deprived of a constitutional right through a policy or decision.  Furthermore,
in some § 1983 cases the plaintiff will have “unclean hands.”  For example, the
plaintiff may have been engaged in criminal conduct when the police deprived
him or her of a constitutional right.  While this clearly does not preclude the plain-
tiff from recovering damages under § 1983, it further removes us from the situa-
tion in Wegner, where we are presented with three innocent parties. See Wegner, 479
N.W.2d at 42.
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police liability and litigation funnels funds away from other municipal
needs.254  These resentments may be compounded in many communities
within Philadelphia, particularly in the poorer sections of the City where
there is a strong distrust of law enforcement.  Many citizens in these neigh-
borhoods feel that police unfairly target minority populations, are overly
aggressive, and are physically abusive.  In these neighborhoods, many feel
that the officers will get away with anything, and that the Department and
its Internal Affairs Bureau will look the other way.  Thus, it follows that the
act of indemnifying officers in civil rights lawsuits merely perpetuates the
fears and frustrations felt by these citizens.255
III. CONCLUSION
Through indemnification, § 1983 cases ending in a judgment or set-
tlement overwhelmingly result in the municipality paying these costs—
even when the conclusion is that an individual officer, not the municipal-
ity is liable.  In Philadelphia, decision-makers have an enormous amount
of discretion when it comes to whether or not to indemnify police officials.
As evidenced in Part I, Pennsylvania’s statute only dictates indemnification
decisions in very limited circumstances and the Philadelphia Police De-
partment’s collective bargaining agreement with the City is silent regard-
ing indemnification.  Despite having a great deal of discretion in the vast
majority of § 1983 cases, the City indemnifies its police officials.  Typically,
Philadelphia only refuses to indemnify its police officials when the rele-
vant behavior has resulted in a criminal conviction.
As noted in Part II, these discretionary decisions should be guided by
a number of different factors: incentivizing the police, reducing constitu-
tional violations, compensating plaintiffs, and, relatedly, spreading costs
amongst community members.  Police indemnification has the potential
to advance each of these interests and, accordingly, consideration of these
interests should typically guide municipal decision-makers to indemnify
police officials.  However, as noted in Part II(E), unchecked, police in-
demnification may also result in more instances of officer misconduct and
increased tensions between police officers and the communities they serve
(the same communities that ultimately fund police indemnification).
To maximize these benefits and minimize harmful effects, police in-
demnification must correlate to adjustments in department policy, im-
254. See Schwartz, supra note 242, at 1164 (noting that “[n]ewspaper stories
and some reports by advocacy groups contend that lawsuits have significant detri-
mental effects on local governments, preventing them from building playgrounds,
hiring teachers, and repairing roads”).
255. The interests of the victim in obtaining full compensation may diverge
from the interests of residents generally in disciplining errant officers.  One of the
challenges of deciding whether to indemnify police officers is how to balance these
varying concerns.  Another issue, which is beyond the scope of this paper is what, if
any, recourse do citizens have when they disagree with how the municipality exer-
cises its discretion to indemnify police officials.  Of particular concern are deci-
sions to indemnify the same officer on repeated occasions.
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proved training, and discipline.  Indemnification shields police officers
from the costs of litigation and liability, but it need not preclude officer
accountability.
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